Geographic Proximity, Trade and International Conflict/Cooperation * This paper examines the interactive effect of distance and trade on international conflict and cooperation. The effect of geographic distance depends on trade, while the effect of trade varies with geographic distance. Trade reduces conflict to a greater extent when dyads are geographically close, but has a greater effect on cooperation when countries are more distant. Geographic proximity increases conflict and cooperation more among non-trading dyads.
Introduction
Studies of international conflict frequently disagree on the causes of war. However, one factor consistently found to enhance a war's likelihood is geographic proximity (Diehl, 1991) .
Closer countries fight more than distant countries. There exist several potential reasons for this relationship (Vasquez, 1995) . First, it may be difficult or even impossible for distant countries to fight each other, mainly because military operations become expensive at great distances. This is particularly true for small or less developed countries. Second, closer countries have more territorial disputes, leading to more conflictive behavior. Territorial disputes may involve resources contained in a given territory that affects a state's willingness to fight (Barbieri and Petersen, 2001 ). Third, and most relevant to our paper, closer countries interact more by nature of their proximity. More interactions provide an opportunity for more conflicts of interest, which can result in more rivalry and strife. Such incentives for conflict contradict neoliberal strands of thought, namely that the greater trade exhibited by closer countries should reduce conflict. This leads to a paradox: On one hand, geographic proximity intensifies conflict, but on the other geographic proximity leads to economic trade which according to neoliberalists diminishes conflict.
The point of this paper is to rectify this paradox by examining how trade and geographic distance work together to influence international interactions. We do so by showing that trade mitigates the increased conflict brought about by geographic proximity (as well as mitigates the effects of distance in diminishing cooperation). As we hope to illustrate, our findings are important both to the geography and conflict as well as to the trade and conflict literatures because we show how geography and trade work together in influencing international interactions. Further Mansfield and Pollins (2001:840-841) argue "too little effort has been made 3 to assess whether the interdependence-conflict relationship is bounded by space…" This paper explicitly deals with how geographic space affects the conflict-trade relationship.
Background
There exists substantial evidence that closer countries are more likely to engage in conflictive behavior. According to Vasquez the opportunity for conflict of interest type disagreements between two countries increases with the number of interactions. Since "contiguity is the single largest factor promoting interactions, contiguous states are more likely to have serious disputes and war." [Vasquez, 1995, p. 280] In addition, not only are contiguous countries more likely to have initial disputes, such disputes between neighboring countries are more likely to evolve into enduring rivalries (Stinnett and Diehl, 2001) . The resolution of an initial conflict may not end the rivalry between countries, allowing other issues to escalate into disputes. On the other hand, contiguous nations face low transportation costs leading to enhanced economic trade (Gowa, 1994) . Similarly, empirical estimation of gravity models finds that the distance between countries is inversely related to international trade (Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995; Egger, 2002) .
Theoretical neoliberal models (Polachek 1980 ) examine how trade influences conflict using an expected utility model. Polachek, Robst, and Chang (1999) extend the model to include an indirect effect of distance on conflict. In their paper, distance reduces trade due to increased transportation costs, with the reduction in trade leading to an increase in conflict. However, their model ignores the direct effect that distance has on conflict. Others consider situations where trade may be more or less important to international conflict. For example, Dorussen (1999 Dorussen ( , 2002 ) develops a multi-country model to show that trade is most important when there are few 4 barriers to trade, when countries will not trade post-conflict, and when there are more countries in the system. Hegre (2004) uses an expected utility framework to show that trade has a stronger effect when there is a symmetrical dependence on trade. Morrow (1999) presents a game theoretic model that examines how trade influences the relative resolve of both initiators and targets of disputes. Trade reduces the initiator's willingness to fight, but also reduces the target's willingness to fight. The reduction in the target's willingness to fight increases the incentives for the actor to initiate conflict and bargain for concessions from the target. As such, trade has an indeterminate effect on conflict. Similarly, Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer (2001) also discuss how trade (or threatening to restrict trade) may be used as a signal of resolve without resorting to violent conflict. As such, trade may reduce violent military conflict but actually increase nonmilitary conflict, particularly if one country is more hesitant to fight.
The relationship between trade and conflict has received substantial empirical investigation as well. While there is little disagreement that closer countries fight more, the question of whether trade reduces conflict is debated in the literature.
1 On one side, Barbieri (1996 Barbieri ( , 2002 argues that bilateral trade increases dyadic conflict. On the other side, numerous studies have found that trade reduces dyadic conflict (Polachek, 1980; Oneal, et al. 1996; Oneal and Ray, 1997; Oneal and Russett, 1997 , 1999a , 1999b . Several studies have attempted to reconcile the disparate findings in the literature (Gartzke and Li, 2003b) , but the debate continues (see Gartzke and Li, 2003c; Oneal, 2003; Barbieri and Peters, 2003) . Much of the debate centers on measurement issues, particularly how to measure economic linkages. Such economic links and interdependences are complex and difficult to quantify with different measures used in the literature. Gartzke and Li (2003b) show that the use of different measures of economic interdependence can account for the contradictory findings in the literature.
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While the importance of developing meaningful measures of economic interdependence is clear, this paper does not seek to contribute to this discussion. The point of the paper is not to consider whether trade in general is important to international conflict, rather this paper attempts to disentangle the contradictory incentives that trade and geographic proximity provide for countries to engage in conflict. We argue that while proximity provides incentives for conflict, trade mitigates these incentives. As such, trade and geographic proximity interact to determine the level of international conflict (and cooperation).
There are at least two potential ways to examine the interactive role of trade and distance in determining international interactions. First, geographic distance has a dual role as it influences conflict directly through reasons discussed by Vasquez and others, and second geographical distance also affects conflict indirectly by influencing trade. As such, one could examine how distance affects trade, which then affects conflict. As geographic distance falls, trade increases, which is expected to reduce conflict. Chang, Polachek, and Robst (2004) use this approach to show that conflict between closer dyads would be even greater if not for the economic gains due to trade. That paper attempts to address the potential endogeneity of trade by estimating a simultaneous equations system modeling trade and conflict. The selection of instruments, however, was not based on a theoretical relationship nor is it clear the instruments meet necessary econometric criteria.
While we revisit the issue of simultaneity later in the paper, the primary purpose of the paper is to consider an alternative perspective by examining whether trade affects conflict differently depending on distance. This finding has implications with regard to the trade-conflict literature in general. There is now research on how the effects of trade vary depending on the particular commodities traded. Whereas Polachek (1980) concentrated on strategic commodities 6 such as oil, Reuveny and Li (2004) examine a larger number of different commodities. This paper shows that the effects are not uniform in another way, namely by geographic distance. This implies that the "Kantian Tripod" is more complicated than a simple triangulation because the way one triangulates varies with distance. In other words, instead of focusing on the main effects of trade or geographic distance as in prior research, one can look at the interactive effects of trade and distance on conflict. In particular, we focus on the questions of whether the effect of trade depends on the distance between countries, and whether the effect of geographic proximity on conflict depends on the level of trade.
Hypotheses
A world system encompasses numerous countries, many trading with each other because the virtues of trade make each country better off economically. What results is a system of intercountry interdependence, which if based on free market principles including free trade and the full mobility of resources, would result in maximal global output. Any country breaking off such a trade relation would decrease its own long-run economic well-being as well as perhaps the well-being of its trading partners and other countries. Nations, however, often do not operate to maximize global output and instead may act to maximize their own welfare. For example, trade may be used as a strategic tool to signal other countries about intentions. In general, much research has examined trade in the context of game theory, with trade creating harmony between countries or a prisoners' dilemma in which countries interact with a risk of cheating.
At the same time the geographic distance between countries affects the optimal amount of interaction between countries. We define interactions to include both cooperative and conflictive events. As such, incentives for interaction may increase conflict, or cooperation, or 7 both. Neighboring countries have more opportunities and incentives for interaction, both conflictive and cooperative. Some of the incentives for conflict were discussed in Vasquez (1995) and were mentioned earlier in this paper. Incentives for cooperation also exist for neighboring countries. For example, Seigle (1988) and Schiff and Winters (1997) discuss how nearby countries may cooperate in order to increase regional security. Polachek (1980) and Polachek, Robst, and Chang (1999) present an analytical model based on expected utility theory to examine the optimal level of conflict. In this paper we present a diagrammatic representation of the model in Figures 1 and 2 . The expected utility model is based on countries behaving in a way to maximize utility subject to constraints. While the discussion in this paper is based on conflict (and cooperation) being determined by equating the marginal gains and marginal costs of conflict (and cooperation), we also incorporate some of the theoretical advances in recent research. (Dorussen, 1999) . Trade often does resume post-conflict (Barbieri and Levy, 1999) , but there are still significant short-run disruptions in trade (Anderton and Carter, 2001) . In addition, a potential actor is unlikely to know with certainty whether the target will resume trade post-conflict. A greater commitment by the target not to resume trade, the greater the actor's perceived marginal cost to conflict (Dorussen, 2002) . (Gartzke and Li, 2003a) . Overall, trade is a complex decision variable much like conflict itself. Distance, while an important factor in determining international conflict and cooperation, is not a choice variable; it is a given exogenous factor.
In spite of these issues, Figure 1 leads to two testable hypotheses. The depiction of the MC curves in Figure 1 is consistent with the current literature. For example, the same hypothesis can be derived from Dorussen (1999 Dorussen ( , 2002 and Hegre (2002) who take a completely different approach. They model conflict as a function of the ratios of the probabilities of victory with p λ denoting the minimum required probability of victory with trade while p 0 the minimum required probability without trade:
Thus, the probability ratio is a function of gains from trade with trade restrictions (λ), the number of countries in the system (n), resources (r), the probability of a stalemate (p s ), a discount factor that reflects the rate of time preference (Φ), and the cost of conflict (c). Dorussen (2002) and Hegre (2002) take the derivative of the ratio with respect to n, the number of countries in the system, to show the pacifying effect of trade is greater when there are more states.
2 In other words, as the number of countries in the system increases, the minimum required probability of victory increases more when there is trade than when there is no trade for the actor to initiate conflict. In terms of our paper, we take the derivative with respect to c, the cost of conflict.
Taking the partial derivative of the ratio with respect to cost leads to the prediction that the pacifying effect of trade is greater when the cost of conflict is lower:
If the cost of conflict is lower for closer countries, trade has a greater pacifying effect. Thus, our use of the expected utility model is not the only model that could be used to derive the hypotheses tested in this paper.
Hypothesis #2: Geographic proximity leads to a greater increase in conflict for dyads with little or no trade.
Optimal conflict increases from point A to C for trading dyads and from point B to D for nontrading dyads. Geographic proximity increases the incentives for conflict regardless of whether countries trade. Conflict increases more for non-trading dyads both because the marginal cost curves are horn-shaped and because we expect the marginal gain from conflict to diminish less quickly when the target of the conflict is closer.
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There are several extensions that could be incorporated into the presentation. The marginal gain to conflict may be lower for distant dyads due to the smaller potential for security or land gains through conflict.
3 Control over resources is more difficult to obtain and retain when there is a greater distance between countries (Anderton, Anderton, and Carter, 1999) . In addition, trade is assumed to increase the MC of conflict, but such an increase may differ based on distance. For example, the composition of trade differs for nearby and distant countries. Hanson and Xiang (2004) present evidence that closer countries tend to trade goods that have higher transportation costs and fewer substitutes. As such, for a given level of trade, the gains from trade may be greater for nearby countries, implying a greater cost to a disruption in trade
Another extension would consider whether the marginal gain from conflict differs across trading dyads. One reason for trade to exist is that one country has a resource or commodity that the other country desires. As such, the ability to gain control over the desired resource may be viewed as a potential benefit to conflict, but only if the actor would actually be successful in such an attempt. If the actor was unsuccessful, then access to the desired resource through trade might also be lost. If the actor perceived a high likelihood of gaining control over the resource and the resource was sufficiently valued, the MG to conflict could increase to the point that optimal conflict would increase. There is another reason to expect higher marginal gains to conflict for some actors. The MG to non-military conflict among trading partners may also be greater if a target faces a particularly high cost to conflict. As such, an actor may have an incentive to initiate a degree of conflict in order to negotiate a greater share of the gains from trade. While we do not explicitly include this extension in figure 1, we will revisit the issue in the empirical section of the paper. depicts the marginal cost of cooperation while MG is the marginal gain from cooperation. The optimal level of cooperation is determined by the intersection of the two curves (point A). As the distance between countries decreases, there are greater benefits to cooperative behavior. One possible reason for this is the security that can be acquired through cooperation with neighboring countries (Seiglie, 1988; Schiff and Winters, 1997) . A country gains greater security through cooperating with a nearby country, increasing the benefits to cooperative behavior. For example, Sandler (1999) argues that one reason for the formation of alliances is the mutual security that arises when interior borders require less protection. This implies a shift in the MG curve to MG′ and an increase in optimal cooperation to point C.
We assume that trade also affects the marginal gain to cooperation. This leads to two additional testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis #3: Trade leads to a larger increase in cooperation for distant dyads than close dyads.
Optimal cooperation increases from point C to D for close dyads and from point A to B for 13 distant dyads. This may seem counterintuitive, but suggests that closer dyads already have an incentive to cooperate. Introducing trade increases the incentive to cooperate, but trade has a larger marginal effect when the countries are more distant and have little incentive to cooperate based on proximity.
Hypothesis #4: Geographic proximity leads to a greater increase in cooperation for dyads with little or no trade.
Optimal cooperation falls from point D to B for trading dyads and from point C to A for nontrading dyads. Countries that trade have an incentive to cooperate. Proximity has a larger effect on cooperative behavior when the incentives to cooperate derived from trade are absent.
Similar to the hypotheses regarding conflict, the hypotheses regarding cooperation could also be derived using alternative models. For example, Snidal (1991) develops a model that examines determinants of international cooperation. A country has a choice in each period. It can receive gains from cooperation for multiple periods which must be discounted to determine the present value of benefits, or alternatively, the country can renege, extract gains for a single period, and cease cooperating. The decision is determined by the discount rate used to compute the present value of cooperation. The higher the discount rate, the lower the future value, and the more likely the country will renege. The discount factor required to support cooperation is related to gains from trade and country proximity in a nonlinear way. Appropriately differentiating the function illustrates that the cooperation-enhancing effects of trade are mitigated by geographic proximity. in the prior year to reduce potential endogeneity.
The use of dollar trade to measure the economic gains from trade may be questioned.
Studies typically use the trade-to-GDP ratio or the proportion of bilateral trade to a state's total trade. None of the typical measures of trade measure the gains from trade that economists would argue are relevant to international interactions (Polachek and McDonald, 1992) . In addition, the coefficients using a ratio measure of interdependence are difficult to interpret. One does not The other primary analysis variable, distance, is the distance in miles between the capitals of the actor and target. Of course, proximity can also be measured by whether two countries are contiguous, which is typically defined as land contiguity or separation by less than 150 miles of water. Indeed, much of the discussion in the literature surrounding proximity involves issues related to contiguity. We focus on distance since the distance between noncontiguous countries can vary significantly. Distance is also typically used as a proxy for transportation costs in gravity models (e.g., Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995; Egger, 2002; Hanson and Xiang, 2004) . As such, we may expect transportation costs and resulting trade to be more interrelated with distance in determining conflict than contiguity.
Before looking at the standardizing variables and regression specification, we present an example of our hypotheses using WEIS data where the United States is the actor country. The example focuses on countries with which the US has political and economic interactions. difference between the values of democracy (0 to 10) and autocracy (0 to -10) from the Polity III data. Oneal and Ray (1997) argue that the two democracy scores, DEMHI and DEMLO, better capture the political distance between countries than a single additive or multiplicative democracy score. All standardizing variables are also lagged to reduce potential endogeneity.
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) multivariate regressions to test the propositions.
We examine how distance and trade are related to dyadic conflict and cooperation. Separate regressions are estimated with the dependent variable equaling weighted conflict and weighted cooperation. One problem with events data is that certain countries are more newsworthy than others. If newspapers concentrate on certain countries, these countries will have more conflict and cooperation in our data. Indeed, preliminary analysis found that the WEIS data has severe problems with selection issues. Much reported conflict and cooperation is between relatively few dyads. We explore two approaches to account for the tendency to report data more frequently on specific states. First, a lagged dependent variable is added to the specification to account for the temporal correlation in the dependent variable (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; Beck and Katz, 2001 ). The use of a lagged dependent variable is appropriate when the dependent variable is continuous. We explored using multiple lags (up to five years), but found this had little effect on the results and we report results using the single lag.
Sensitivity analysis found the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable was not adequate to account for the substantial reporting on the interaction between two dyads (US-Canada and US-Japan). These two dyads appear to be outliers and the results are very sensitive to how we account for these dyads. Since it is inappropriate to allow a few observations to alter general results, we also included categorical variables in the specification denoting these two dyads.
Given that distance is time invariant, these dyads will not contribute to the estimated distance-conflict relationship, but since trade varies over time they will contribute to the estimated tradeconflict relationship. Results were relatively insensitive to including variables denoting other closely followed dyads. The specifications take the form: Second, a fixed effects approach is used to account for unobserved time-invariant characteristics that may influence conflict and cooperation. The unobserved characteristic we want to control for is the propensity for certain countries to receive more press coverage, and as a result, have more reported conflict and cooperation in events-type data.
The use of fixed effects models is controversial in international relations research.
Green, Kim, and Yoon (2001) use dyad fixed effects to assess the effect of economic interdependence on conflict. Their study was strongly criticized in comments by Beck and Katz (2001) and Oneal and Russett (2001) . In essence the comments argue that including variables denoting each dyad is inappropriate in this type of analysis, especially given the rare nature of the dependent variable. We agree that a dyad fixed effects approach would be inappropriate for 20 most dyads in our analysis. First, the extremely large number of dyads and relatively short time frame results in unstable coefficient estimates. Second, the distance between countries is a time invariant characteristic and a dyad-level fixed effects model would be unable to disentangle the distance effect from the time invariant fixed effect. Beck and Katz also note that a dyad fixed effects model is essentially the same as adding a lagged dependent variable to the specification with a coefficient restricted to one.
In order to avoid these criticisms we included categorical variables in the fixed effects specification denoting each actor in the data. Such an approach allows for variation in distance between the actor and various targets, avoiding the main pitfall of a dyad fixed effects approach.
Once again, the results were sensitive to the treatment of the US-Canada and US-Japan dyads and we include categorical variables denoting these two dyads. Thus, the fixed effects specification examines the effect of trade and distance on dyadic conflict/cooperation holding constant the average propensity of an actor to engage in conflict or cooperation (or the average propensity of newspapers to report on such interactions). In this case, the specifications are:
where Actor i is a vector of categorical variables denoting each actor. Both approaches are estimated to determine whether the results are sensitive to the specification.
Results

Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics are provided in 
Conflict
We presented two hypotheses that pertain to international conflict. First, we conjectured that trade leads to a reduction on conflict, with the marginal effect being greater for closer dyads than distant dyads. Second, we argued that distance leads to less conflict, with the effect being greater for dyads with little or no trade. The results in Table 3 results show that the greater the actor's democracy score, the greater the amount of conflict, but the greater the target's democracy score, the lower the amount of conflict. In other words, actor democracies tend to be more conflictive with target non-democracies.
Earlier in the paper, we discussed how an actor's desire to acquire resources from a potential target or influence the terms to trade might lead to increased conflict if the actor perceives a reasonable probability of success. We attempt to control for this probability by 24 including variables in the specification measuring the capabilities ratio and whether one or both countries is a major power. It is noteworthy that conflict is lower when the actor has a capabilities advantage over the target, but is much higher when the actor is a major power and the target is not. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to adequately explore this issue, regressions were reestimated separately with the sample divided based on whether only the actor was a major power. Trade was found to have a weaker negative effect on conflict when only the actor was a major power. As such, the mitigating effect of trade on conflict might be weaker if a major power has a greater ability to appropriate desired resources.
Cooperation
There were two hypotheses presented pertaining to cooperation. First, trade leads to an increase in cooperation, with the effect being greater for distant dyads than close dyads. Second, distance leads to reduction in cooperation, especially for dyads with little trade. The results in Table 4 are consistent with both hypotheses.
<Table 4>
The trade coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that trade would decrease international cooperation. But this is the case only when the distance between countries is extremely small. The positive and significant coefficient on the distance·trade interaction indicates that trade has a stronger effect on cooperation when the countries are more distant.
While the marginal effects are discussed below, trade increases cooperation for almost all observed distances between countries. As trade increases, the incentives for cooperation increase. But an incentive to cooperate already existed for closer dyads, as such the marginal increase is greater for more distant dyads.
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Closer countries cooperate more than distant countries. The coefficient on the distance·trade interaction suggests that the effect of distance on cooperation is much smaller when countries trade. In other words, as the distance between countries increases the incentives to cooperate decline. But a dyad that trades still has an incentive to cooperate, thus the reduction in cooperation is smaller for trading partners.
Marginal Effects
The marginal effects of distance and trade are reported in Table 5 . The marginal effects are computed by taking the derivative of the regression results with respect to trade (distance) and then evaluating the derivative across a range of distances (trade values). We only report the marginal effects from the most detailed specification that controls for lagged conflict/cooperation and actor fixed effects. Conflict decreases with trade, but not over the entire distribution of distance. Interestingly, trade increases conflict for dyads that are most distant.
On the other hand, conflict falls as distance increases regardless of the amount of trade.
<Table 5>
Cooperation increases with trade, but the effect is much greater when countries are more distant. Cooperation falls when countries are farther apart, with trade having a relatively small impact on the relationship.
Empirical Extensions
Comments received from reviewers for this journal lead us to estimate several additional models. First, the inclusion of a single lagged dependent variable may not be adequate to account for temporal effects. We estimated actor fixed effects models with two, three, four, and 26 five lags, but the coefficients on trade, distance, and the distance-trade interaction did not change significantly. The additional lagged dependent variables, while statistically significant, were taking explanatory power from the actor fixed effects. Another issue discussed by the referees involves the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the regressions. The dependent variable is a weighted frequency of conflict or cooperation and might be considered a categorical or count variable instead of a continuous variable. As such, we estimated each specification using an ordered logit model. All results are qualitatively similar to those reported above. We do not report the logit results due to the difficulty in interpreting interaction coefficients in logit models (Ai and Norton, 2003) . We did not explore using a count model given the dependent variables are weighted, and not merely counts.
A second problem with OLS centers on the simultaneous nature of conflict and trade.
Conflict may be determined by trade, but trade is also determined by conflict. For example, Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (2004) used a simultaneous equations framework and found trade does not reduce conflict. We use lagged trade to mitigate this issue in the above section, but the existence of enduring rivalries suggests that this may not adequately account for the simultaneous nature of the relationship. Thus, we attempted to use a two-stage procedure to examine this issue. Several instruments were suggested by a referee including factor abundance and population, which are similar to the instruments used by Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (2004) . We tested various combinations of actor and target population, iron and steel production, energy production, year, regions, and Tau with the system leader as instruments for trade. 4 The results are presented in Table 6 and are consistent with those presented earlier in the paper. Trade reduces conflict, and the effect of trade is greatest when the distance between countries is smaller.
<Table 6>
Why do we find such different results from prior research? The answer lies in the selection of instruments. When using instruments similar to those used by Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (2004) , we also were unable to find a significant relationship between trade and conflict. Below we discuss why these results may be biased due to the selection of invalid instruments.
There are at least two primary considerations in selecting instruments. First, the instruments must be correlated with the endogenous variable. The use of instruments weakly correlated with the endogenous variable can bias results as much as a model assuming exogeneity (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995) . Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest a minimum F statistic of 10 for the joint significance of instruments in the first stage regression. The first stage regression passed this test for all combinations of instruments that we tested. Thus, the difference in results is unlikely to be explained by the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variable.
The second requirement is that the instruments must be uncorrelated with the error. A system of equations using instrumental variables correlated with the error is typically referred to as overidentified. We use Bassman's (1960) test for overidentification, and our final choice of instruments was based on their ability to pass the overidentification test. In the end we were able to find a combination of instruments that passed the test for two of our three specifications, settling for the combination that produced the smallest F statistic in the one specification. But we began by testing combinations of instruments that included actor and target population since Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (2004) We recognize the importance of disentangling the simultaneous relationship between conflict and trade. The issue of simultaneity is complex and difficult to account for correctly.
Instruments typically used in prior research fail exogeneity tests. The instruments we use pass the required statistical tests, but are not beyond criticism since their selection was not based on a clear conceptual framework. Clearly this issue requires further work in future research.
Lastly, one referee suggested we consider a different approach to looking at actor fixed effects. The coefficients on the actor categorical variables indicate how conflict varies across actors, but tell us little about why conflict varies across actors. Mundlak (1978) proposes including the mean of each independent variable instead of the fixed effect. As such, one can learn more about the differences between different actors along with looking at the effect of characteristics within actors. We estimated this type of specification with conflict and cooperation as dependent variables respectively and report the distance and trade coefficients in 
Conclusion
The distance between countries has clear implications for international conflict. While the effect of trade on conflict is questioned in the literature, much research shows the trading partners tend to have less conflict. Closer countries however, have more conflict and more trade.
As such, Vasquez (1995) questions the ability of the "international interactions" hypothesis to explain the distance-conflict relationship. First, he asserts that empirical analysis does not uphold predictions that the distance-conflict relationship should be waning over time. Second, he asserts that the international interactions hypothesis contradicts the neoliberal approach. We argue that both the neoliberal economic interdependence and the international interactions approaches have a role in explaining the distance-conflict relationship. We present a diagrammatic model based on published theory and present empirical evidence to support our claim. The marginal effects are computed by taking the derivative of the regression results with respect to trade (distance) and solving across the distribution of distance (trade). 
